

Hellinger Differential Privacy

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Motivation and backgrounds



Problem description

1. **Data collection:** Many entities collect individually identifiable data to provide personalized services and **share** them with other organizations to improve and enhance the quality of the service.
2. **Risks:** Sharing sensitive data may release personal information, which is illegal.
3. **Privacy protection:** Statistical methods, such as **differential privacy**, can be used to prevent re-identification while remain statistical structure of the data.




Differential privacy

1. **Goal:** Reduce the risk of re-identification of personal information based on a statistic.
2. **Method:** Introduce randomness to the statistic, for example: adding an appropriate noise.
3. **Applications:** US Census Bureau, IT companies such as Google, Apple, Healthcare organizations such as Epic, Cardinal Health, etc.
4. **Question:** How to decide the “**correct**” amount of randomness?




Basic terminology

- Adjacent datasets:



- Query function and mechanism:



- A **mechanism** is a perturbation of the **query function**.




Basic Idea of DP

The basic ideas behind DP are the following:

- Start with a query and identify the **sensitivity** of the query using **adjacent** datasets.
- Identify an appropriate **mechanism** to perturb the output from the query.
- Release the perturbed output.



Basic Idea of DP





Mechanism

- We focus on additive mechanism: $M(T) = T + \epsilon$.
 - Gaussian mechanism: $\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$.
 - Laplace mechanism: $\epsilon \sim Lap(0, b)$.



Divergence

- Divergence between 2 distributions, $D(M_1 || M_2)$, can be used to measure the difficulty distinguishing M_1 from M_2 .
- Definition of divergence: For 2 distributions with density $p(x)$, $q(x)$,
 - $D(p || q) \geq 0$.
 - $D(p || q) = 0 \iff p(x) = q(x)$.

Note that the divergence may not be a metric.



Types of differential privacy

- Max divergence: $\epsilon - DP$. [Dwork et al. (2006)]

$$D_{\infty}(M_1 || M_2) = \max_{S \in \text{Supp}(M_2)} \log \frac{\mathbf{P}(M_1 \in S)}{\mathbf{P}(M_2 \in S)} \leq \epsilon$$

- A relaxation of $\epsilon - DP$: $(\epsilon, \delta) -$ differential privacy.

$$D_{\infty}^{(\delta)}(M_1 || M_2) = \max_{S \in \text{Supp}(M_2)} \log \frac{\mathbf{P}(M_1 \in S) - \delta}{\mathbf{P}(M_2 \in S)} \leq \epsilon$$



Types of differential privacy

A common way to write $\epsilon - DP$ and $(\epsilon, \delta) - DP$ is as follows:

- $\epsilon - DP$:

$$\mathbf{P}(M_1 \in S) \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \mathbf{P}(M_2 \in S).$$

- $(\epsilon, \delta) - DP$:

$$\mathbf{P}(M_1 \in S) \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \mathbf{P}(M_2 \in S) + \delta.$$



Types of differential privacy

- Rényi divergence: (α, ϵ) -Rényi differential privacy ($\alpha > 1$).
[Mironov (2017)]

$$D_\alpha(M_1 || M_2) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \int \left(\frac{f_{M_1}(x)}{f_{M_2}(x)} \right)^\alpha f_{M_2}(x) d\mu(x) \leq \epsilon$$

- Hypothesis testing approach: μ -Gaussian differential privacy.
[Dong et al. (2022)], [Avella-Medina et al. (2023)].

$$H : x \sim f_{M_1}(x) \quad \text{v.s.} \quad K : x \sim f_{M_2}(x)$$

$$H : x \sim N(0, 1) \quad \text{v.s.} \quad K : x \sim N(\mu, 1)$$

Differential privacy

Hellinger differential privacy



Hellinger differential privacy

For two density function p, q , squared Hellinger distance is defined as

$$D_{HD}(p, q) = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \left(\sqrt{p(x)} - \sqrt{q(x)} \right)^2 dx$$

- ϵ -HDP [[Deng and Vidyashankar \(2025b\)](#)]: A mechanism M is said to satisfy ϵ -Hellinger differential privacy if

$$D_{HD}(M_1, M_2) \leq \epsilon$$



Power Divergence Privacy

- The power divergence between two densities p and q is

$$D_\lambda(p, q) = \frac{1}{\lambda(\lambda + 1)} \mathbf{E}_q \left[\left(\frac{p(X)}{q(X)} \right)^{\lambda+1} - 1 \right].$$

- A mechanism M is said to satisfy (λ, ϵ) -Power divergence differential privacy (PDP) if

$$D_\lambda(M_1, M_2) \leq \epsilon.$$

- When $\lambda = -\frac{1}{2}$, we obtain $2HD^2(p, q)$.



Power Divergence Privacy

- If M is additive Gaussian mechanism,

$$D_\lambda(M_1, M_2) = \frac{1}{\lambda(\lambda + 1)} \left[e^{\frac{\lambda(\lambda+1) \|W(D) - W(D')\|_2^2}{2\sigma^2}} - 1 \right].$$

- Set $\Delta_{L_2} W = \sup_{D, D'} \|W(D) - W(D')\|_2$.
- Then to obtain (λ, ϵ) - PDP the variance of the perturbation is given by

$$\sigma^2 = \sigma_{\lambda, \epsilon}^2 = \begin{cases} (\Delta_{L_2} W)^2 \cdot \frac{\lambda(\lambda+1)}{2 \log(1 + \lambda(\lambda+1)\epsilon)} & \text{if } \lambda(\lambda + 1) \neq 0 \\ (\Delta_{L_2} W)^2 \cdot \frac{1}{2\epsilon} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- Under additional calculations, one can show $\sigma_{\lambda, \epsilon}^2$ is minimized at $\lambda = -\frac{1}{2}$.




Hellinger differential privacy

- **Relationship with other types of differential privacy:**
 - ϵ - HDP implies (ϵ', δ') - DP, $\epsilon' = 0, \delta' = \epsilon$.
 - ϵ - HDP implies μ - GDP, $\mu = 2\Phi^{-1}(\frac{\epsilon+1}{2})$.
- **Post processing guarantee**


$$M(T) \sim \epsilon - \text{HDP} \implies g(M(T)) \sim \epsilon - \text{HDP}.$$

Hellinger differential privacy

- Composition rule
 - Sequential composition



- Adaptive composition





Minimum Hellinger distance estimation

- Let X_1, \dots, X_n be i.i.d. random variables postulated to be distributed according to $f_\theta(\cdot)$, $\theta \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^d$. Let $g(\cdot)$ denote the true density. The minimum Hellinger distance estimator of θ is the minimizer of

$$\hat{\theta}_n = \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} D_{HD}(g_n, f_\theta),$$

where $g_n(\cdot)$ is a nonparametric estimator of $g(\cdot)$.

- Under family regularity and identifiability conditions, the minimizer exists and equals θ_0 if $g(\cdot) = f_{\theta_0}$.



Computing the estimator

- Two possible algorithms:
 1. Gradient descent method
 2. Newton-Raphson method
- How to make the algorithm private?



Private optimization methods

- **Question:** If we adopt the additive mechanism, how do we add noise to the estimator?
- **Loss function:** $L_n(\theta)$.
- **Statistic:** $\hat{\theta}_n = \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} L_n(\theta)$
- **Answer:**
 - Inject noise directly into $\hat{\theta}$. This approach requires knowledge of the explicit distribution of $\hat{\theta}$.
 - Integrate noise into the algorithm computing $\hat{\theta}$ from the loss function $L_n(\theta)$.




Private gradient descent

- Choose the mechanism.
- Predetermined number of iterations K .
- Identify the query and in every iteration calculate σ using the HDP property.
- Return the updated estimator.




Private gradient descent (contd.)

$$\hat{\theta}_n^{(k+1)} = \hat{\theta}_n^{(k)} - \underbrace{\eta}_{\text{learning rate}} \left(\nabla L_n(\hat{\theta}_n^{(k)}) + \sigma Z_k \right)$$





Private gradient descent (contd.)





Privacy budget allocation

- If our overall privacy budget is ϵ , then we would like to distribute it over the K iterations. The *composition rule* plays a significant role in this part.
- Distributing the budget equally between iterations, namely, each iteration satisfies $\frac{\epsilon}{K} - HDP$, then $\hat{\theta}_n^{(K)}$ satisfies $\epsilon - HDP$.



Utility

- We next ask, how close is the private estimator to the non-private estimator?
- The main result is:

$$\|\hat{\theta}_n^{(K)} - \hat{\theta}_n\|_2 \leq \Delta_n \cdot R(K, \epsilon, m) \text{ with high probability.}$$

- In the above,
 1. Δ_n is L_2 sensitivity of gradient (Hessian) of $L_n(\theta)$.
 2. $\Delta_n \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.
 3. m is the dimension of θ .
 4. $R(K, \epsilon, m) \rightarrow \infty$ as $K \rightarrow \infty$.



Utility

- For M estimator, $\Delta_n \sim \frac{1}{n}$. [Avella-Medina et al. (2023)].
- For minimum Hellinger distance estimator, $\Delta_n \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$.
 - $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} f_\theta(x)$.
 - $g_n(x)$ is kernel density estimator.
 - $L_n = \int \left(\sqrt{f_\theta(x)} - \sqrt{g_n(x)} \right)^2 dx$.
 - Sharper bound $\Delta_n \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \cdot \frac{1}{n^\eta}$ has been studied in [Deng and Vidyashankar \(2025a\)](#) to achieve efficiency. $\eta > 0$ is a positive constant.



Oracle Property

- The sharper bound plays a crucial role when establishing the limit distribution of the private MHDE. Specifically, we show that as $n \rightarrow \infty$,

$$\sqrt{n}(\hat{\theta}_n^{(K_n)} - \theta_g) \xrightarrow{d} N(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma_g)$$

and $K_n \sim \log n$ for gradient descent and $K_n \sim \log \log n$ for Newton Raphson method.



Numerical Experiments

The simulated dataset contains 1000 observations with $N(5, 2^2)$. We are doing 5000 repetitions.

		ϵ		
		2.00	0.60	0.20
Estimator	μ : Mean (Std.)	4.991 (0.083)	4.989 (0.2)	4.996 (0.349)
	σ : Mean (Std.)	1.984 (0.058)	2.002 (0.144)	2.043 (0.256)
CI coverage	μ : 95%	0.861	0.836	0.824
	σ : 95%	0.819	0.933	0.927

Table 1: Results for different values of epsilon (Gradient descent)

Differential privacy

Concluding Remarks



Concluding Remarks

- We described a new differential privacy metric called ϵ -HDP.
- We discussed the private version of gradient-descent and Newton-Raphson methods for obtaining private MHDE.
- We established the utility and efficiency of our estimator.



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